A Participatory Universe of J. A. Wheeler as an Intentional Correlate of
  Embodied Subjects and an Example of Purposiveness in Physics by Nesteruk, Alexei V.
 1 
 
A “Participatory Universe” of J.  A. Wheeler as an Intentional 
Correlate  of  Embodied Subjects and an Example of Purposiveness 
in Physics1 
 
Alexei V. Nesteruk2 
Department of Mathematics, University of Portsmouth, Lion Gate Building, Lion Terrace 
Portsmouth PO1 3HF, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the role of human subjectivity and its delimiters in articulating the universe in 
physics and cosmology. As a case study, we reflect upon the complex of ideas of the so called 
Participatory Universe by later J. A. Wheeler. The objective of the paper is to explicate the role of the 
human agency as a centre of disclosure and manifestation of the universe as well the as teleology of 
scientific representation of the world implied by the intrinsic purposiveness of human actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A metaphysical interpretation and understanding of the 
world is neither scientifically attainable nor scientifically 
excluded. It is another mode of cognitive approach to the 
world, a transition from the (as much as possible) neutral 
observation of the world to a personal relationship with the 
world. It is a product of the freedom of humankind, and 
therefore interpretation and understanding define its entire 
stance towards the world , its mode of use of the world. 
 
Scientific observation does not simply affirm the reality of 
the cosmos; it constitutes it as an existential fact…,then 
every reality is recapitulated in the relationship of 
humanity with an active reason (logos) as an invitation-to-
relationship, which is directed towards humanity alone.  
 
Christos Yannaras, Postmodern Metaphysics, pp. 114, 118, 
137. 
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Introduction 
In  a recent paper (Nesteruk, 2012[2]) the issue 
of delimiters in cosmological research which 
originate in the structure of the human knower 
was addressing in particular how the 
purposiveness of human actions cascades 
towards the purposiveness of cosmological 
research (Nesteruk, 2012[3]). The latter paper 
dealt with a “formal” purposiveness in 
cosmology related to the explicability of the 
universe. This explicability is linked to the 
human intentional search for the sense of its 
own existence in the universe, so that the 
purpose of explanation in cosmology is related 
to the explication of the human condition. It 
was argued, in particular, that the theoretical 
representations of the “universe as a whole” and 
“the Big Bang” (as the encapsulated origin of 
the universe) act as the telos of cosmological 
explanation and, hence, as well, as the telos of 
anthropological explanation related to the 
origin of individual persons at birth (Nesteruk 
2012[1]). In this paper we would like to 
discuss, as a case study, an interesting example 
of how  scientific development in the 20th 
century  led a famous physicist John Archibald 
Wheeler to extend the naturalistic 
methodology together with classical ideal of 
rationality (where subject and object are 
entirely separated and the world is supposed to 
pre-exist independently of human insight and 
its activity) towards that which can be 
described as a phenomenological stance 
portraying man as the centre of disclosure and 
manifestation of the world. It is of interest 
that this extension has some teleological 
connotations, bringing teleology into the heart 
of scientific explicability of the universe.  
 
 Wheeler, after a long intellectual 
evolution working in physics, attempted  to 
approach physical reality  not as something  
“out there”, which is  passively described by 
observers, but to see it as a genesis through 
conscious dialogue between observers-
participants and physical reality, so that the 
universe emerges as a special  articulation  of 
the  relationship between  human intelligence 
and physical reality (Wheeler 1994[1], p. 128). 
This approach, challenging the natural 
scientific attitude, was not appreciated by 
physicists who found Wheeler’s ideas 
“unpalatable in view of its rather mystical 
overtones” (Carr 1998, p. 158),  and hence has 
not received any further attention and 
development. A sceptical reaction of physicists 
to Wheeler’s ideas can be understood because 
his ideas represent a metaphysical extension of 
physics which physicists do not consider as a 
part of their vocation and duty. However, seen 
historically and in particular in conjunction 
with philosophical developments in the 20th 
century, this was not an entirely arbitrary 
attempt for it manifested a certain inevitability 
of sliding towards a transcendental or 
phenomenological appropriation of physics if 
the latter were to be to tackle the issue of  its 
own  foundation and its very facticity. A 
simple question which must be posed by any 
physicist who is interested to know the truth 
would this: why is physics possible at all? And 
here the question is not only about the 
intelligibility of the world, but rather of the 
very basic existential premises  of physics  
related to humanity as its agent. Physics, as a 
science and social activity, is a product and a 
certain accomplishment of human beings who 
are themselves part of the physical world. In 
this sense the facticity of physics is related to a 
particular position of human beings in the 
world, such that this world allows them to 
produce its own explication and description. 
On purely philosophical grounds, this 
explicability and description has an absolutely 
contingent character related, speaking in 
Heideggerian terms, to that fragment of the 
unconcealed being which is associated to a 
specific living  presence, that is human 
persons. Still, for physicists, prone to 
reductionism, there remains a question as to 
whether physics itself can explicate its own 
existence, or, in a slightly different parlance, 
can some simple initial rules of interaction 
with the world (which, in fact, presuppose the 
world’s explicability from the beginning) lead 
with necessity to that picture of the world 
which we have here and now. In this sense the 
case of Wheeler’s thought (in spite of deviating 
from the established stream of physics)  
represents an example, in the history of 
scientific ideas, of how a naturalistic 
epistemology in science in attempting to make 
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a certain self-correction, through the search 
for its own facticity, leads to a transcendental 
problematic (remarkably with teleological 
overtones), that is to the view that the complete 
picture of physical reality must include the 
conditions of its explicability and constitution.  
 
Wheeler develops his own 
transcendental argument basing himself in 
Einstein’s theory of Relativity and Quantum 
Mechanics which, according to him, changed 
the vision of the human position in the 
universe by making  human beings  co-creators 
of physical reality in a very non trivial sense. 
He reformulates de facto the famous paradox 
of human subjectivity in the world 3  which 
states, on the one hand,  that humanity 
communicates some palpability and sense to  
the physical world,  and, on the other hand, 
the fact  that human incarnate subjectivity is a 
finite accomplishment of this world:  
                                                
3 This paradox is a perennial problem of philosophy 
and was anticipated by ancient Greek philosophers 
and Christian thinkers. It was expressed differently 
by such philosophers as Kant (see, for example, 
Kant’s conclusion to his Critique of Practical 
Reason.) Among phenomenological philosophers 
who dealt with this paradox one can mention E. 
Husserl, M. Scheler, M. Merleau-Ponty, E. Fromm 
and others.  The general discussion of this paradox 
can be found in  (Carr, 1999). The role of this 
paradox in discussions on  science and theology can 
be found in (Nesteruk,  2008, pp. 173-75). Applied 
to the study of the universe the paradox of human 
subjectivity can be formulated as follows: on the 
one hand human beings in the facticity of their 
embodied condition form the centre of disclosure 
and manifestation of the universe as a whole, 
modelling it as overall-space and time which 
exceeds the limits of the attuned space related to 
humanity’s comportment on the planet earth (the 
home place). On the other hand the depicted 
universe as a vast continuum of space and time  
positions humanity in an insignificant place in the 
whole totality making its existence not only 
contingent (in physical terms) but full of nonsense 
from the point of view of the actually infinite 
universe.  Said bluntly the actual infinity of the 
universe is attempted to be articulated from an 
infinitely small part of its formation. One could 
express this differently: through its insight 
humanity is co-present in all points of what it 
observes in the universe, or imagines, while 
physically being  restricted to an insignificant part 
of it.  
 
“The brain is small. The universe is 
large. In what way, if any, is it, the observed, 
affected by man, the observer? Is the universe 
deprived of all meaningful existence in the 
absence of mind? Is it governed in its structure 
by the requirement that it gives birth to life 
and consciousness? Or is man merely an 
unimportant speck of dust in a remote corner 
of space? In brief, are life and mind irrelevant 
to the structure of the universe – or are they 
central to it?”(Wheeler 1975, p. 270).4   
 
 Let us comment on this passage from 
the point of view of the already existing 
insights which came before Wheeler in 
philosophy and theology.  
 
“The brain is small. The universe is 
large.” Indeed the size of the physical organ, 
which is responsible for mental articulation of 
the whole universe is incommensurable with 
the spatial size of the visible universe. Still, 
and this is an existential fact, it is from within 
this spatial scale that the articulation of 
microscopic realities of particles and fields, as 
well as huge astronomical formations is 
possible by this organ. There is something in 
this incommensurability, which is not 
physical, or, at least is not based on physical 
interactions. The very idea of a continuum of 
the universe as a single and united whole, 
although inaccessible to the empirical grasp, 
reflects a non-local and non-physical property 
of the world which is detected by consciousness 
through the power of intuition.5   
 
                                                
4 Certainly such a questioning on the place of 
humanity in the universe is not novel in history of 
thought and philosophy. It is enough to point to 
Pascal, who compared human being with the 
“thinking  reed” whose position in the universe is 
ambivalent because of the physical insignificance 
and epistemological centrality: “Man is a reed, the 
feeblest in nature; but he is a thinking reed. The 
whole universe need not take up arms to crush 
him…But even if  the universe should crush him, 
man would still be more noble than that which kills 
him, since he knows he is mortal, and knows that 
the universe is more powerful that he: but the 
universe itself knows nothing of it” (Pascal 1959, p. 
78). 
5 See in this respect (Weyl 1994). 
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“In what way, if any, is it, the observed 
[the universe], affected by man, the observer? 
Is the universe deprived of all meaningful 
existence in the absence of mind?” Physics 
teaches us that, through our own spatial and 
temporal insignificance in the whole grandeur 
of the universe, we are just late newcomers into 
this world who only recently started to 
interfere with the physical environment on 
this planet. Our ability to affect the cosmos at 
large is only a matter of science fiction and 
some futuristic prophecies. 6   However the 
question of Wheeler has another, much more 
serious dimension related to epistemology: will 
the universe as we observe it, that is see it in its 
particular contingent appearance as intricately 
related to our physiological and psychological 
constitution, be unconcealed to us in a 
different way, related to that measure, which 
man will be, in relation to that which can be 
unconcealed. Responding to the second half of 
a question formulated in the beginning of this 
paragraph, the question of the universe in 
absence of the human mind is an ontic  
question: indeed one can build, so to speak 
onto-cosmology (in analogy with onto-theology 
criticized by Heidegger), in which the universe 
will be an impersonal being allegedly existing 
independently of the human grasp, to which 
one can attribute many intellectually imposed 
properties. The question then is what is the 
value of this universe for human beings. 
Rephrasing Heidegger, “can one dance and sing 
in front of such a universe”? (Heidegger 1969, 
p. 72). The answer has been given long before 
by the proponents of theological insights, that 
the universe without human beings is dumb 
and it is humanity which is the “voice” 
(hypostasis) of the universe (See, for example, 
(Torrance  2001, p. 4), (Clément1976, p. 91)). 
The question of Wheeler is exactly about this: 
can one predicate the universe as existent 
without regarding humanity in measure of 
interaction with which this universe comes to 
                                                
6 One of such prophecies was promoted by F. 
Tipler in his book (Tipler 1995) where he develops 
an idea of such a large-scale affection of the 
universe which will guarantee the possibility of  an 
indefinite information processing, which, according 
to Tipler mimics the persistence of life in the 
universe.  
its unconcelment? The development of physics 
in the 20th century with its increasing 
understanding that its results depend on the 
contexts which are not strictly objective and 
detached from us, but are set up by us through 
experiments and measurements, led Wheeler to 
an intuition that the mechanistically 
constructed  representation of the universe 
remains no more than an idea, a mental 
accomplishment. Correspondingly the 
“meaningful existence of the universe in the 
absence of the mind” is a contradiction in 
terms, for the very word meaning has strictly 
human connotations (if we avoid any 
references to theology, which can suggest that 
the meaning of the universe originates in the 
creative and willing activity of the divine 
agency, which or who sustains this universe 
through creation out of nothing). In view of 
this, Wheeler attempts to address the issue of 
meaning: where the meaning comes from and 
whether it can come from some underlying 
physics, initially free from human insight 
physics. 
  
Wheeler’s enquiry into the foundations 
of the historical contingent facticity of physics 
came to its explicit manifestation in his train 
of thought after a long period in his scientific 
activity when he was following a scientific 
programme of Einstein, who believed that it 
was possible to unify different physical forces 
reducing them to some geometrical effects. 
Wheeler spent a considerable effort to advance 
the so called  “geometrodynamics” whose 
essence was also to explain the genesis of 
macroscopic space and time by appealing to 
some underlying structures which follow the 
rules of quantum physics (Wheeler 1968). 
Wheeler argued that space-time is a classical 
concept,  an approximation,  which is 
incompatible with the quantum principle 
(Wheeler 1973, p. 227). This meant to Wheeler 
that the basic ingredients of classical physical 
theories, such as space and time,  cannot 
survive their extrapolation into the 
microscopic world where quantum principle 
rules, so that space and time are not basics and  
are subject to change and further explication. 
Generalising this observation Wheeler makes a 
much more radical conclusion about the 
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mutability of physics, which implies that all 
classical physical concepts, while they loose 
their sense in the limiting case of microscopic 
scales, and, in particular, in a context of 
gravitational collapse predicted by general 
relativity, are subject to genesis from the realm 
which has no obvious and visual physical 
characteristics at all. In other words, physics 
which is usually associated with some 
immutable laws, constants of nature and 
harmonies in the world ceases to function in 
extreme cases such as gravitational collapse 
corresponding to the origin of the universe, so 
that, according to Wheeler, “there is no law 
except the law that there is no law” or 
“ultimate mutability is the central feature of 
physics” (Wheeler 1973, p. 242). One must 
reflect upon this last assertion with a grain of 
a philosophical scepticism, for the ultimate 
mutability of physics cannot serve as its 
transcendental delimiter: physics is impossible 
if mutability reigns in the universe simply 
because experience cannot then be ordered. 
Mutability excludes any identity in time for, 
according to Wheeler, there is no time, so that 
the mutability implies an infinite degree of 
differentiation in being, which cannot be 
stabilised even hypothetically in any reflecting 
thought. Still this mutability has a limit: the 
world of existences with human observers must 
be produced from it and retrospectively 
constituted. Thus from the beginning the 
mutability affirmed has its limits originating 
in the counterfactual causality towards this 
mutability following from the actuality of the 
empirically present (and immutable to some 
extent) physical world. This causality is linked 
to the human agency which constitutes the 
world. And this human agency enters 
Wheeler’s scheme through the “quantum 
principle” by which he means an 
epistemological, as well as ontological claim 
originating in the extreme version of the so 
called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics that quantum phenomenon is 
phenomenon as long as it is observed and 
articulated  by some intelligible agency. This 
implies that what physics calls “nature” is not 
just something “out there”, in itself, but  that 
which is constituted  through the interaction 
of intelligible beings (who are capable of 
asking questions and receiving the responses) 
with  that “something” which is initially 
inarticulate and which is being questioned.  
Wheeler writes: “Nothing is more astonishing 
about quantum mechanics than its allowing 
one to consider seriously the  view that the 
universe would be nothing without 
observership as surely as a motor would be 
dead without electricity” (Wheeler 1994, p. 39). 
Then he comments on observership,  referring 
to the views of Bohr and Wigner who 
advocated that observation and measurement 
are complete when   they enter consciousness of 
an observer and then can be communicated to 
another observer in a plain language; “.. an 
experiment is only an experiment when the 
outcome is expressed in the form of 
communicable knowledge, knowledge which 
can be shared” (Wheeler 1994[1], p. 26). But 
“observership” is not a simple term, it cannot be 
defined prior to the act of observation and 
establishing its meaning:  “What is 
‘observership’? It is too early to answer. [..] The 
main point here is to have a word that is not 
defined and never will be defined until that 
day when one sees much more clearly [..] how 
the observations of all the participators, past, 
present and future, join together to define what 
we call ‘reality’ ” (Wheeler 1994[1], p. 26). By 
employing a phenomenological language, 
reality, according to Wheeler,  is defined as an 
intentional correlate of cumulative acts of 
observation and as a communal 
accomplishment along a particular, 
historically contingent, but, perhaps, 
teleologically driven ways. The meaning of 
reality can only be established if  there is a  
field of intersubjectivity with some trans-
empirical features, which transcend  physical 
past, present and future. It is in the framework 
of this intersubjectivity through its continuous 
embodiment through observership-
participation  that the truth and  meaning of 
things is established.  
 
Being a physicist, Wheeler does not 
pretend to provide any sophisticated theory of 
how to derive the meaning of physical concepts 
such as space, time, particles etc. from a deep 
level of human subjectivity, that is the outline 
of their constitution. This is the work of 
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phenomenologists who do not appeal to any 
vague physical analogies. Instead of this 
Wheeler traces the logic which is inherent in 
physical thought which makes the genesis of 
these concepts plausible through their 
consistency with each other. On the basis of 
this he conjectures that  we enter now a “third 
era of physics”, which should explain the 
genesis of such  concepts: “we have to account 
for all  the structure that makes physics what 
it is” (Wheeler 1983, p. 404).7 Wheleer believes 
that the question “What makes meaning?” 
applied to physics, is an existential question, 
for it also addresses the issue of  the existence 
of human beings and the universe. But unlike 
existential philosophers, who were sceptical 
about science’s capacity to deal with this issue8, 
he believes that physics itself can address the 
issue of the facticity of existence: “Tomorrow, 
will it not  be existence itself that comes under 
the purview of physics?” (Wheeler 1983, p. 
404). 
 
 The more radical, metaphysically 
oriented conclusion of Wheeler is that the 
overall reality, that is  the totality of the world,  
is constituted through the interaction between 
the inarticulate “out there” with human 
intelligent agencies who create the network of 
questions  and answers directed to and received 
from what they intend to call “reality”. It is 
interesting that this trend of Wheeler’s thought 
is similar to phenomenology which asserts 
nature, as articulated worldly reality, as 
having sense only in the context of the dialogue 
between human consciousness and that which 
is posited by consciousness. It is the dialogue 
with the unarticulated otherness of 
consciousness that ultimately reveals the 
                                                
7 Wheeler’s appeal is in a way similar to a 
phenomenological assertion that without taking into 
account the generating power of human 
subjectivity, the efficacy of the sciences, either 
human or natural, remains obscured; see e.g.  
(Gurwitsch 1966, pp. 399-400). 
8 Existentialists considered the fact of life as a 
primary data for any further philosophising, the fact 
which as such cannot be placed in any allegedly 
wider and more general framework of the world’s 
necessities. The radical metaphysical mystery of 
existence is expressed in human inability to “look” 
at this existence from outside.  
meaning. J. Kockelmans, a philosopher and 
commentator of Husserl,  writes with respect to 
this dialogue that the meaning of the world 
arises in the encounter between man and the 
world  and   “exists only in an interplay of 
question and answer. We find the question in 
the world but it is still implicit and vague. 
Through my reply, which itself is a question, 
the first question becomes sharper so that a 
more accurate answer becomes possible. 
Meaning arises  in a dialectic  relationship 
between man and the world, but it is not 
possible to say which of the two first begins the 
‘interplay’ and which of the two first gives 
meaning to the other” (Kockelmans 1966, p. 
53). This passage is strikingly  similar to 
Wheeler’s ideas that physical reality reveals 
itself as an evolving complex of meanings in 
the course of the interplay between questions 
and answers which the human subject 
addresses to and receives from that “out there” 
which is eventually constituted by human 
observers as the physical  reality and nature. 
Wheeler writes: “Physics gives light and 
pressure-tools to query and to communicate. 
Physics also gives chemistry and biology and, 
through them, observer-participators. They, by 
way of the devices they employ, the questions 
they ask, and the registrations they 
communicate… develop all they know or ever 
can know about the world” (Wheeler 1988, p. 
5). Elsewhere  he develops a simple analogy 
with a game of twenty questions which aims to 
recognise a word preconceived and hidden by a 
person through a simple process of 
interrogation of this person subjected to a 
single rule that it must be consistent with all 
previous questions and responses. In fact, if 
this word was not preconceived in advance, it 
will inevitably be constituted through the logic 
of the game simply because there must be 
answers “yes” or “no” which through a certain 
logic and questions’ content, constitute the 
sought word (Wheeler 1979).  Similarly, he 
claims, in nature, by asking questions we 
initiate the process of nature’s response, which, 
in the course of enquiry leads us to the 
constitution of that which we intuitively 
aimed.    Phenomenology described this process 
as a mental accomplishment of what is 
understood by nature: “nature”, which science 
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aims at through idealization and 
mathematisation, is not something a-priori 
given to human observers and thinkers, but 
something which is constructed and evolved 
towards an indefinite telos.  “Nature”, thus 
constructed, becomes exteriorised as an ideal 
(Gurwitsch 1974, p. 46) which is subject to 
accomplishment in a historical  movement of 
scientific research because mathematics as 
human science is far from being static and 
accomplished, 9 and its advance creates more 
space for physicists to invade the realm of the 
yet unknown (although, perhaps, intelligible 
and invisible).   In this sense, in analogy with 
phenomenology which makes a distinction 
between nature as it appears in primary 
perceptual  experience (the inarticulate out 
there in Wheeler’s scheme) and nature-for-
physicists (that is “nature” as constituted 
through questions and answers), which is a 
mental accomplishment,  as an ideal limit of 
convergent sequences of  “images of nature” 
which are constructed by physicists in the 
course of history, one should treat Wheeler’s 
genesis of meaning as  an ever-going mental 
completion of the concept of nature. In the 
words of another phenomenologist, A. 
Gurwitsch, “nature” appears to be a “hypostasis 
of mental creations” 10 : this  terminology 
resembles an old philosophical and theological 
notion  of the so called en-hypostasization 
(personification, or human articulation) of 
nature or the universe. 11  Seen in this 
perspective, Wheeler’s treatment of  physical 
reality through quantum and computational 
synthesis makes it clear that the notion of 
physical reality, nature, or the universe has 
sense only in the context of humanity, which is 
in a position to relate it to the commonalities 
of perceptual experience, that is to put it in the 
context of incarnate existence-in-situation, as 
well as recapitulate them through an 
                                                
9 See on temporality and mathematics (Davis, 
Hersch,  Descartes’s Dream, 1990, pp. 189-201).  
10 This expression, used by (Gurwitsch  1974, p.  
44) did not mean “hypostasis” in a theological 
sense. Elements of nature as “mental creation” also 
appeared in the terminology of Einstein. See, for 
example, (Einstein 1973, p. 291).   
11 See a careful explanation of the meaning of this 
term in (Nesteruk 2003, pp. 112-17; 2004). 
intelligible representation. It is in this sense 
that one can suggest that all images of the 
mathematised nature manifest  the presence of 
the immutable dualistic constitution of things 
in the world, namely a fundamental 
differentiation (Gr.: diaphora) between the 
empirical and intelligible.  
 
 When we have pointed out that the 
construct of “physical nature” in Wheeler’s 
scheme represents  an ideal, which can only be 
accomplished in the whole of the historical 
process, we assumed this as a philosophical 
hypothesis about hidden teleology in the 
scientific advance. Correspondingly, the 
progress of articulation of nature through its 
computational synthesis has meaning only as 
one particular tendency of the human spirit 
under which scientific knowledge and 
technology advance.  The universe then is to be 
constructed along some particular path of 
knowledge corresponding to the human 
condition. Indeed Wheeler’s questions and 
answers create a particular way forward in 
bringing reality to unconcelament, the way 
which in its historical concreteness is 
contingent and non-generic. However, one 
must recognise together with a 
phenomenological critique of the 
mathematisation of nature12, that the universe 
constructed along the lines of Wheeler’s 
scheme represents characteristically  the 
fragmentation of the primary existential link 
between humanity and the world,  considered 
through a particular discursive function of the 
human intellect which is based on abstraction 
and idealisation.  “Nature” in the thus 
understood scientific sense, being a particular 
human accomplishment,  does not exhaust the 
totality of reality. On the one hand the 
constructed “nature” is exteriorised by  human 
subjectivity and is intended as  being  devoid of 
its inward existence in the hypostasis of 
                                                
12 It was his last book, The Crisis of European 
Sciences (Husserl 1970), where Husserl undertook 
a critique of the mathematisation of nature whose 
inception was associated with the name of Galileo. 
The topic was later discussed and developed in 
numerous papers. See, for example, (Gurwitsch 
1967), (Kvasz 2002). 
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human beings, on the other hand the same 
“nature”, as being constructed, still  entails 
some traces of its hypostatic origin. In 
different words, “nature” appears in a mode of 
intentional immanence related to those aspects 
of the overall reality which are not hypostatic 
in themselves,   but  en-hypostasised  by human 
obsrervers-participants. By taking de facto a 
phenomenological stance, Wheeler proclaims 
that the world is not a clock-like machine 
which has been pre-constructed and then 
discovered by human observers; it is a self-
synthesized system, coming into existence 
through the constitution of reality via 
questions and answers processed by a collective 
of persons-observers who are capable of 
establishing the meaning  and interpretation of 
their observation-participancy ultimately 
leading to an integral view of nature.   
 
Participatory universe and human 
agency 
 
As we mentioned above the main ambition of 
Wheeler’s concept is to approach the issue of 
genesis of “meaning” and hence “reality” of the 
universe  in strictly physical terms. He 
attempts to explicate this genesis by employing  
as its primary elements observations and 
measurements as certain intentional acts of 
consciousness with  respect to the world. The 
physical happenings which are assumed in a 
naively realistic view as taking place 
contingently without being observed and 
measured,  are contraposed to those events  
which were brought irreversibly into being by 
conscious intentions expressed through 
observations, so  that  the traces of  presence of 
these intentions in being  cannot be erased 
(Wheeler 1987, p. 311). These events can be 
called existential events because they involve 
human presence and it is in these events that 
the meaning of what is observed is established. 
The most difficult philosophical issue is 
exactly where and how this meaning comes 
from. Here Wheeler needs to give more precise 
definition of the human agency as that centre 
of disclosure and manifestation which provides 
this meaning.  
 
The human agency is portrayed by 
Wheeler as a network of observers, who by 
means of  communication establish the 
meaning of what is called physical reality. 
Wheeler’s thought follows a kind of a 
reductionist emergent philosophy, by asserting   
that consciousness is a product of blind 
physical forces and myriads of particles in the 
universe. However, the reference to blind 
physical forces and chance prior to the 
established human articulation is made as a 
matter of rhetoric because  the universe as the 
“world of existences” did not exist “prior” to 
human subjectivity: “observers are necessary to 
bring the universe into being.”13 The universe 
thus is a participatory universe; its existence is 
relational upon the existence of intelligent 
observers whereas the existence of observers is 
being relational upon the ingredients of the 
universe.  There is a certain reciprocity 
between the universe and observers: one cannot 
exist without the other (DeLaguna 1966, p. 82).  
 
As to the origin of  reflecting and 
articulating consciousness in the universe,  
Wheeler sincerely believes that  science  will be 
able to provide  an explanation of  the origins 
of human intelligence in the future (Wheeler 
1994[1], p. 307). This  corresponds to his 
implicit desire to treat both intelligence as well 
as the intelligible image of the universe as 
emergent properties. The human phenomenon , 
then,  would be an inevitable result grounded 
in  purely natural factors, and the “tangible 
reality of the universe” would be just natural as 
well, although of a different, animated or self-
reflected order. In one of his famous diagrams, 
illustrating the transition from the view of the 
dead mechanical universe to the universe as the 
world of existences, Wheeler represents the 
universe as a self-excited circuit, that is as 
developing through a cycle (closed loop) which  
excludes reference to  any preexistent 
foundation outside this circuit (Wheeler 1994, 
p. 293) (see a more sophisticated diagram in, 
for example,  (Wheeler 1988, p. 5)). In both 
diagrams the self-awareness of the universe 
through human intelligence, represented by 
                                                
13 This is a short formulation of the Participatory 
Anthropic Principle. See (Barrow, Tipler, 1986, p. 
22). 
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Wheeler as the network of observers- 
participants, completes the “evolution” of the 
universe in Wheeler’s sense as the movement 
along the closed circuit. In fact, this so called 
“evolution” cannot be seriously treated as 
related to the objective pole in the universe, 
that is as physical or biological evolution as if 
it were devoid of the human insight. The 
“evolution” is itself a construction in the course 
of observer-participancy, whose completion is 
represented by the intelligent agency explicated 
by means of the same intelligence which is 
supposed to be a part of the diagram. 
Correspondingly there is no way out from this 
circuit, that is  there is no  foundation of the 
circuit outside itself. From a philosophical 
point of view  this means that since the circuit 
is closed, and the universe receives its 
explanation from within it, no question on the 
purpose of the universe and its end can be 
posed in the sense of the material of the nexus 
finalis (that is, as if they existed in objects 
independently of the human intelligence): 
purpose and end are just the emergent 
attributes of the world of existences which 
pertain to the observer-participancy as human 
activity. The world’s  existence and its history 
according to humanity is explained from 
within its particular formation and, in 
reflection, results in a  monistic view  which 
does not require any appeal to trans-worldly 
factors. Wheeler argues that his model of a 
closed circuit escapes the danger of an infinite 
regress of causations towards the ultimate 
substance similar to that of the ancient Greek 
philosophy (Wheeler 1987, p. 313; 1994[1], p. 
300). 14  
                                                
14 Wheeler argues that his approach to 
understanding the place and role of man in the 
universe contrasts to the selection mechanism of the 
many worlds (MW) version of the Strong AP 
(which assumes pre-existence not only of the 
visible universe, but also the multitude of other 
universes) in a sense, that the Participatory AP is 
“founded on construction” (Wheeler 1987, p. 310).  
He articulates this contrast as an opposition in 
views on the place of man in the universe as 
mediocre versus central: “Life, mind, and meaning 
have only a peripheral and accidental place in the 
scheme of things in this view [i.e. MW-Strong AP 
(A.N.)]. In the other view [that is,  Participatory AP 
(A.N.)] they are central. Only by their agency is it 
 
However it is not difficult to realise 
that the notion of underlying physical 
substance to which one can make an ultimate 
reference is replaced by the  network 
(community) of human observers who “create” 
the physical world as constituted reality.   
 
In similarity with existential 
philosophy and theology Wheeler gives 
priority to human persons who produce 
meaning, rather than impersonal substance 
which is an abstract and impersonal notion. 
This entails a tacit anthropological assumption 
about embodiment, which  is present in 
Wheeler’s theory of the universe, namely the 
constitution of intelligent hypostatic observers 
as unities of sensible bodies and soul which 
produce the coherent view of the universe: 
there is no explanation as to why this 
particular composite was brought into being. 
The logic of explanation is different, that is,  
the universe has a dual structure:  as an 
undifferentiated stuff with no meaning (before 
observers developed) on the one hand, and as 
sensible agencies and objects with meaning on 
the other  (or, in different words, as the 
sensible and intelligible) after the network of 
observers developed the intersubjective 
meaning of what was  observed. This is the 
reason  why the “observers are necessary to 
bring the universe into being”, that is,  to 
transform something initially undifferentiated 
and non-articulated   to things  which are 
sensible and intelligible. 15  This implies, 
according to Wheeler’s logic that the 
intelligibility of the universe is rooted in the 
ability of human beings to establish its 
structures and  patterns through 
communication, starting from some elementary 
observations-measurements which are 
described by quantum theory. It is clear  that 
                                                                    
even possible to construct the universe or existence, 
or what we call reality. Those make-believe 
universes totally devoid of life are (according to 
this view) totally devoid of physical sense not 
merely because they cannot be observed, but 
because there is no way to make them” (Ibid.). 
15 The place of observer is not to “create out of 
nothing” in a theological sense, but to act a an 
ancient god-demiurge who orders the universe from 
preexistent matter. 
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the deposit of intelligibility has been tacitly 
present in Wheeler’s scheme of being from the 
very beginning. Human observers who explain 
the universe and their own place in it are 
already there even if the very scheme of being 
does not introduce them at a given stage yet. 
This also makes it clear  that in spite of man’s  
“central” position  in Wheeler’s meaning 
circuit it is not central enough, for the very 
existence of this circuit is possible because 
mankind can transcend its particular place in 
it  and integrate the whole circuit in a single 
consciousness. This implies that while being a 
part of the meaning circuit human beings 
transcend it in the sense that they have an a-
priori ability to contemplate  the universe as a 
whole  and position themselves  in it before 
they consciously account for their position 
through the abovementioned diagram. In other 
words, there is an inherent consubstantiality 
between human observers and the universe 
which is not articulated at the initial parts of 
Wheeler’s scheme, but which is tacitly present 
through the very possibility of depicting those 
parts of physical reality which have not yet 
produced humanity. But this consubstantiality 
has, so to speak, a transcendental character; for 
it is detected by human consciousness through 
the next order of reflection. In this humanity 
exhibits itself as metaphysically infinite 
creatures, living in the conditions of a physical 
finitude, the finitude which is constituted by  
humanity itself from the perspective of the 
infinite.  
 
Here the analogy with transcendental 
philosophy can be invoked. Indeed, if Wheeler 
claims that the observers bring the universe 
into being, including its space, time, etc. 
(Wheeler 1988), then one can reasonably ask: 
where do human observers do this from, if 
there is no preexistent space and time?  This 
question is reminiscent of the famous Kantian 
affirmation that human being is phenomenon 
and noumenon at the same time. On the one 
hand human beings as biological organisms are 
in space and time. On the other hand, 
according to Kant, space and time represent 
transcendental forms of sensibility as the 
necessary conditions for human perception of 
the physical bodies.  This means that because 
human beings constitute space and time from 
the depths of their transcendental ego which is 
eidetically “prior” to any particular form of 
physical embodiment, one can conjecture that 
they inhere in “something” which is beyond 
and  prior to space and time and which, at the 
same time, contains in itself the potentiality of 
being explicated in terms of space and time.  
 
Wheeler attempts to claim that the 
meaning of space and time, as well as all other 
attributes of the universe, is constructed 
through observership-participation in acts of 
cognition resembling quantum measurements. 
A philosopher, in the style of Kant, would 
object to this by saying that the sense-data 
alone can not constitute the notions of space 
and time and that,  vice versa,  the ordering of 
the sense-data can only be done in rubrics of 
space and time which are a-priori forms of 
sensibility.   Whereas a phenomenological 
stance would be that  space is not pre-existent 
and objective “out there”, originating from 
subject’s passive contemplation of it, but in 
terms of subject’s comportment “in” it. This, so 
called, attuned space becomes an initial instant 
and a medium of disclosure of that “objective” 
space through relation to which this subject is 
constituted as a corporeal existent in space. 
However, this relationship is manifest of a  
paradox similar to that of the container and of 
the contained put in an interrogative form: 
how can  one grasp the relationship of a 
particular being (subject) as if ‘in’ space when 
this being is essentially constituted by being 
‘over against’, and hence beyond space? 
(Ströker 1965, p. 15). This once again brings us 
to the Kantian stance on human being, as 
being simultaneously phenomenon and 
noumenon: on the one hand space is an a-
priori form of sensibility which allows a 
subject to order its experience; on the other 
hand this form of sensibility is unfolded not 
from within that space which is depicted by it, 
that is it comes from beyond any possible 
spatial presentation of experience.   
 
What is obvious, however, is that the 
constitution of space, first of all of the attuned 
space, is  intertwined and not detachable from 
the fundamental aspect of human embodiment 
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or corporeity. Embodiment or corporeity 
manifests itself not as a system of some 
biological processes nor as simply a body 
animated by the soul, nor even a simple unity 
of both of them. It is not also a lived body 
(corps-sujet in a sense of G. Marcel); it is a 
living being in relation to other beings and to 
the world, in whom this relation is announced 
and articulated by  the way of its sense-
reaction and its comportment, or its action in 
situation. In this sense the constitution of 
space in all its varieties (from attuned space of 
immediate indwelling to mathematical space of 
the universe) represents the modes of 
explication of embodiment or corporeity of 
humanity through which it interacts with the 
world. Thus the lived body entails a kind of 
lived space which bears the character of self-
givenness “in the flesh”. In other words, the 
initial point of any discourse on corporeity and 
associated spatiality implies knowledge as 
presence  “in person” or “in the flesh” as a mode 
of givenness of an object in its standing in 
front of the functioning corporeity. 
 
The question of embodiment becomes 
acutely important in Wheeler’s scheme of 
origin of the universe as the world of 
existences. Indeed, what is important is that 
the network of observers is the community of 
embodied creatures, and this embodiment per 
se reflects the pre-existing physical conditions 
which are not subject to considerable change 
during the span of the human civilisation. In 
other words, one can assume together with 
Wheeler that these conditions of embodiment 
as statements of physics have not been always 
articulated, but they have been implied,  so 
that any physics which follows from a 
cognitive acquisition of the world is prone to 
contain the conditions of embodiment as 
transcendental conditions for the explicability 
of nature. It is in this sense that the famous 
Weak Anthropic Principle (Weak AP) can be 
taken into account: what we observe may be 
restricted by the conditions necessary for our 
embodied existence as observers.  Then the 
unfolding process of Wheeler’s articulation of 
the world contains in itself the very possibility 
of existence of those creatures who articulate 
this world. In spite of a contingent path of 
articulation of nature, which is related to the 
history of the sciences, this contingency 
contains an element of necessity: this 
articulation and constitution takes place only 
in relation to that bulk of being which is 
unconcelad through the conditions of 
embodiment. The famous thesis of Protagoras 
that man is the measure of all things, seen 
through the eyes of Heidegger (Heidegger 1987, 
p.91-95), gives strength to our assertion that 
the constitution of reality according to 
Wheeler, being an open-ended process, is still 
human-centred because the very explicability 
of the world through the chain of questions 
and answers is subjected to the condition of its 
origination in embodiment. It is important to 
realise that neither the Weak AP, nor the 
participatory genesis of Wheeler make an 
explicit link of the limits of embodiment 
expressed in physical terms to the limits of 
cognitive methods of exploration  of reality (as 
was famously proposed by Kant through 
reference to Euclidian Geometry and 
Newtonian physics).  In terms of exploration of 
physical reality one can either gain access to 
processes beyond the scales of embodiment 
through technology, or even transport the very 
conditions of embodiment on spaceships to 
some hostile terrain in order to  gain 
knowledge of that which is beyond the Earthly 
horizon of embodiment. In this sense the Weak 
AP or the Participatory strategy of Wheeler 
state nothing of the restrictions on the 
methodology of research, or in different words, 
they avoid any commitments to the limits of 
possible knowledge in the sense of its methods. 
In this sense they both are more flexible in 
comparison with the Kantian dogmatic 
position. However the Kantianism remains in 
both Weak AP and Participatory AP in a 
hidden and more subtle way through the 
implicit teleology which pertains to the very 
way nature becomes unconcealed and 
explicable in the conditions of embodiment. 
 
In order to make the ambivalent 
position of the human observer 
(noumenon/phenomenon) more explicit, one 
might  place our discussion  back in the 
Kantian frame of mind.  Space and time as 
being constituted by intelligible observers in 
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Wheeler’s scheme of things can be said as being  
brought into being by transcendental observers  
whose existential centre relates to the physical 
world but is not exhausted by it. In this sense 
the genesis of reality, or its constitution as 
articulated in consciousness, appeals to the 
realm of the intelligible. Space and time as 
articulated notions, as well as the whole 
universe appear as mental images of reality, as 
ideas which have a precarious relation to 
physical reality. By learning the lessons from 
Kant, it can then be anticipated that any 
attempt to provide a coherent picture of the 
‘genesis’ of the concept of the universe, that is 
to speculate about its ultimate grounds on the 
physical level, will inevitably lead reason to an 
antinomian difficulty. This consequently 
places the notion of the community of 
observers which gives meaning to the universe 
in an ambivalent position of being in the 
world, and at the same time not of the world.  
 
Indeed, one can conjecture that the 
thesis of Wheeler’s Participatory AP, namely 
that “observers are necessary in order to bring 
the universe into being”, makes the notion of 
the network of observers in Wheeler’s concept 
similar to the idea of an absolutely necessary 
being that appears in the fourth Kantian 
antinomy so that Wheeler’s proposition can be 
reformulated as a participatory anthropic 
antinomy (See also (Nesteruk 1999, p. 83; 2003, 
p. 225)): 
 
Thesis: The network of intelligent observers 
understood in a transcendental sense as 
existing in whatever relation to time and space 
is absolutely necessary for the visible universe 
in space and time to be brought into being. 
 
Antithesis: The existence of the visible 
universe with spatiotemporal attributes is not 
contingent upon the existence of the network of 
intelligent observers (understood in a 
transcendental sense) as its cause either in the 
visible universe or out of it. 
 
This antinomy indicates the dichotomy 
in the ontological status of the network of 
intelligent observers as having a specific 
location of their embodiment related to the 
physical conditions of survival  and, at the 
same time, as transcending these specific places 
and establishing the sense of space and time 
out of some originary  propensities that define 
the observers  as intelligible and consciously 
non-local beings. This seeming paradox, which 
represents a particular reincarnation of the 
paradox of human subjectivity mentioned 
above, contributes to the constitution of human 
observers as composites of the corporeal and 
intelligible whose contingent facticity cannot 
be accounted for, remaining thus a primary 
metaphysical mystery. This cascades up to the 
mystery of the universe as the constituted 
World of Existences: since the origin of human 
personhood can hardly to be reduced to the 
results of impersonal chances and necessities in 
physical factors and causality, its presence in 
the universe can be treated as an event which 
can be called the humankind-event (Nesteruk 
2003, pp. 194-200). This event is indeed 
formative for the universe to exist, that is to be 
manifest and disclosed in human personhood. 
Then the process of constitution of the universe 
in Wheeler’s participatory scheme reveals itself 
as the enhypostasization  of the universe  
within the humankind-event, that is the 
universe itself becomes no more than an event 
related to the  history of humanity, a flash of 
the universe’s self-consciousness depicted in 
Wheeler’s writings by a diagram of the human 
eye emerging in the bold letter U (symbolising 
the universe) which itself is the formation of 
this  eye (Wheeler 1994, p. 293). 
 
Some other philosophers formulated a 
similar “eventiality” of the universe by 
referring to a communal character of events of 
knowing. In P. Heelan’s  terms, “the 
phenomenon takes ‘flesh’ in the world 
differently because its ‘flesh’ is determined 
only as a consequence of decisions taken by 
local and historical communities of expert 
witnesses”(Heelan 1992, p. 58).16 It is in this 
sense that the articulation of the past of the 
universe is an event within the life-world of a 
particular community loaded with a sense of 
the community’s lived past and of decisions to 
                                                
16 The metaphor of ‘flesh’ is borrowed from M. 
Merleau-Ponty.  
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be made in the future. As Heelan points out,  
“it is not the case that every historical event is 
also an event of a scientific kind…, but when 
the local community is one of expert witnesses, 
then the scientific data produced by that 
community are also historical events in 
relation to that community” (Heelan 1992, p. 
66). H. Margenau argued in a similar way that 
“physical reality” is best defined as the totality 
of all valid constructs. In this approach the 
universe is defined not as a static, but as a 
dynamic formation: “…the universe grows as 
valid constructs are being discovered. Physical 
entities do not exist in a stagnant and 
immutable sense but are constantly coming 
into being” (Margenau 1944, p. 278).17  
 
Wheeler, as well as the others,  
attempts to make a point  that  the sense of 
physical reality is not a pregiven compendium 
of laws and facts and that it originates in the 
constitution of this reality through formation 
of meaning of the universe through 
communication in the network of observers. 
Wheeler does not give any specific model of 
how to deduce the meaning from the forms of 
intersubjectivity, but his “reconstruction” of 
logical steps involved in making physical 
theories articulates the fact that in spite of the 
idealisation and mathematization with which 
modern physics operates, there is still a level of 
understanding which itself cannot be described 
through them. In other words, physics cannot 
account for its own facticity only through 
physics itself: one needs to appeal to such an 
order of reality by reference to which physics 
                                                
17 Margenau anticipated that many scientists would 
disagree with such an attitude because they 
maintain a faith in the convergence of the system of 
the entire set of physical explanations which would 
deliver them an ideal of their aspirations, that is a 
unique and ultimate set of constructs for which 
would reserve the name ‘reality’. However he 
points out that this belief in convergence in 
question is problematic because it is not capable of 
scientific proof. ((Ibid). See also (Margenau 1977, 
p. 76) The situation in modern cosmology, where 
the ever increasing set of theoretical constructs 
reveals the components of the matter content of the 
universe which escape physical description points 
exactly to the danger of idealisation of the scientific 
description of the universe: the more details we 
know the less we understand the entirety.    
at least receives its interpretation. This 
implicitly  points out to the mundane fact that 
the scientific advance, despite its complex 
language, is ultimately rooted in the primary 
experience of the world, in that which 
phenomenology calls the life-world. 18  This 
implies that the sphere of human subjectivity 
as immediately given and irreducible to any 
scientific analysis is assumed by Wheeler to be 
present in order to develop from within it the 
articulated picture of the world with a special 
language and mathematics. Wheeler’s 
conjecture that the whole edifice of modern 
physics can be  reduced to a simple quantum 
principle,  “it is from bit” (Wheeler 1994, p. 
295), shows that there is still a certain level of 
reality behind these “bits”, which constitutes 
the meaning of any sequence of those bits and 
this reality is the  mystery of embodied human 
consciousness which endows reality with 
meaning. However, the observers who possess 
the ability to articulate the external world, are 
incapable of comprehending the very 
possibility of acts of consciousness which are 
responsible for the articulation of the world.  
Can physics explain them in naturalistic 
terms?  In spite of a heroic attempt of Wheeler 
to propose a scheme for elucidating this 
problem, his intellectual construction of  the 
participatory universe demonstrated with a 
new force that the main philosophical mystery 
of human intentional consciousness and its 
engagement with the world still remains (Cf. 
Marcel 1965, p. 24).  
 
 In spite of a philosophical scepticism 
with respect  to Wheeler’s attempts to give a 
physicalistic model for the genesis of meaning 
of the universe as a process of mutual 
interaction between the network of observers   
and their physical environment one should 
admit that they contributed in a non-obvious 
way to the rearticulation of the life-world as 
that primary existential milieu which lies in 
the foundation of scientific articulatiuons of 
reality. The search for the foundations of the 
universe, as well as the foundations of physics 
                                                
18 The concept of the life world was introduced  in 
Husserl’s Crisis (Husserl 1974) and was a matter of 
vast discussion by phenomenological philosophers. 
See for a recent review  (Steinbock 1995). 
 14 
leads inevitably to the recognition of the 
centrality of existential “immediate here” and  
“immediate now” from which the whole 
grandeur of the universe  (as the world of 
existences) comes into existence by “contracting 
its existing” in life of human observers (Cf. 
(Levinas 1978, pp. 82-85; 1987, pp. 42-44). This 
confirms a general philosophical conviction 
that science contributes to the understanding 
of life and humanity, for “the whole universe 
of science is built upon the world as directly 
experienced, and if we want to subject science 
itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a 
precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we 
must begin by reawakening the basic 
experience of the world of which science is the 
second-order expression” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 
p. ix (emphasis added)).  That which was 
formulated by M. Merleau-Ponty in the 
context of existential philosophy  has been 
renewed in Wheeler’s metaphysical extension 
of physics: namely to remind physicists that all 
their notions are ultimately inherent in the 
very specific place human beings occupy in the 
world which they attempt to articulate. 
However, the nature of human subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity, for obvious philosophical 
reasons 19 , did not enter as a constitutive 
principle of physical explanation. The mystery 
of human intelligence was recognised as  
pivotal for developing an articulated picture of 
the world, but, at the same time consciousness 
and intelligence were treated in a reductionist  
sense as products of physical and biological 
evolution. If Wheeler’s model of the 
participatory universe is assessed through the 
eyes of an existential stance on the primacy of 
the sphere of human subjectivity, expressed, 
for example, in the words of Merleau-Ponty, 
quoted above, then obviously the universe as a 
self-exited circuit must require for its 
ontological assessment one crucial element: the 
                                                
19 The fundamental problematic character of any 
philosophical enquiry into the nature of human 
consciousness is expressed in modern terms 
through a concept of the  so called “negative 
certitude” meaning that the facticity of 
consciousness can only be approached with 
certainty in negative terms, that it is certain that its 
mystery can only be predicated in terms of that 
which is not this consciousness (see (Marion 2010, 
pp. 21-86)).   
presence of conscious insight overlooking this 
universe from above and beyond.  
 
 In order to make the latter thought 
clear, one can suggest a graphical 
interpretation of three typical cosmological 
diagrams which pretend to catch the unity of 
physical reality at different spatial scales and 
other physical parameters. Indeed at the figure 
in the Appendix we have three different 
representations of such a unity: in the upper 
left corner there is an image of the so called 
Uroboros, symbolising the interconnectedness 
of physical entities at different spatial scales of 
the universe (Primack 2006, p. 160). 
Humanity’s consubstantiality with the 
universe is depicted at the bottom centre of this 
diagram. In the second diagram, below, there is 
a display of various objects in the universe 
according to their sizes and masses (Barrow 
1999, p. 32). Once again humanity is positioned 
as a mediocre physical formation at the centre 
of this diagram. Both these diagrams are 
presented as static formations which do not 
reflect any processes or genesis of these 
diagrams, that is their epistemological 
constitution. Correspondingly, any attempt to 
predicate on their basis that humanity is 
physically insignificant in the universe will be 
philosophically weak because both diagrams 
are mental creations and humanity is present 
in them not only through its insignificant 
position but above and beyond all its elements 
as an articulating consciousness. This is 
depicted by positioning the human subject 
outside the diagrams while retaining the traces 
of its physical embodiment. If now one 
compares the Uroboros and the size/mass 
diagram with Wheeler’s graphical 
representations of the participatory universe 
(the right-hand side of the same figure) 
presented through a genesis of physical 
properties of the world towards its 
intelligibility (Wheeler 1988, p. 5), then the 
difference is clearly seen: the diagram attempts 
to encapsulate a temporal aspect in formation 
of the overall picture of the universe and make 
manifest  that the universe is an 
accomplishment because the human 
phenomenon in it is itself an accomplishment.  
However the presence of human beings as 
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forms of biological life does not entail with 
any physical necessity the presence of 
intelligence. Correspondingly the diagram of 
the closed-circuit universe is not just an 
accomplishment of physics, it is a mental 
accomplishment which is contingent upon 
intelligence, which is, through embodiment, a 
part of the diagram and, at the same time, 
something outside of it. In other words 
Wheeler’s diagram presupposes for its own 
existence the presence of intelligence which 
creates this diagram: humanity appears in it as 
the centre of disclosure and manifestation. The 
physical genesis depicted in this diagram 
requires a reflecting consciousness which has 
propensities  which do not simply follow from 
the chain of physical causations. In this sense 
the genesis of physical properties leading to the 
fulfilment of the necessary conditions for 
observer’s existence does not entail the 
fulfilment of the sufficient conditions which 
justify intelligence and the way this 
intelligence approaches reality through the 
logic of questions and answers suggested by 
Wheeler. Once again, what is missing in 
Wheeler’s diagram is the presence of the 
subject for whom this diagram makes sense. 
And this subject is above and beyond this 
diagram (depicted at the centre), in that 
directly experienced world, given to humanity 
in its embodied consubstantial constitution so 
that the diagram itself, phrasing this in the 
language of Merleau-Ponty, is the second-order 
expression of this world. 
 
 From  a philosophical point of view 
there is a gap in Wheeler’s reasoning on the 
universe as an emergent meaning circuit, for 
there is no  explanation as to why the 
intelligent observers, who reveal the 
intelligibility of the entire universe, are  
possible at all. In other words, why the 
universe entails the transcendental conditions 
of its own explicability. Here Wheeler invokes 
a kind of a theological reference by affirming 
that the whole situation in modern science 
completely changed the problem of creation as 
the problem of the relationship between man 
and God. If in the traditional theology human 
observers were treated as created by God in his 
image and thus having an innate ability to 
articulate the whole creation, in contemporary 
science these observers are treated as a result of 
the natural development of the world, so that 
the articulation of the world is part of the 
ongoing process of development of humankind. 
To accentuate this contrast Wheeler in one of 
his texts refers to an old legend of the dialogue 
between Abraham and God  (which manifested 
the relationship between man and God) and 
says that “in our time the participants of the 
dialogue changed. They are the universe and 
man”  (Wheeler 1994, p. 128). In the same 
passage he imitates the dialogue between the  
universe and man as an act of personifying the 
universe through the sequence of questions and 
answers. The universe acquires a sort of 
“intelligibility” as its “natural artefact”.  
 
 In conclusion, the main interesting 
result of Wheeler’s attempts to sketch the 
“physics of meaning” was the rediscovery of the 
issues of the life-world. Physics has sense as 
long as it has meaning, which was assigned to 
it by human beings. This means that physics is 
essentially human, as well as the universe 
constructed through physics, and represents an 
intentional correlate of human 
intersubjectivity, so that it is given to us in so 
far as it contains us. The world of classical 
physics which was deprived of its inward 
existence in subjectivity, receives back its 
existential meaning through the metaphysical 
extension of some propositions of quantum 
physics. In spite of the fact that there is no  
direct reference to the Divine as the ultimate 
source of human intelligibility in the world, 
there is a  reference to the otherness of the 
world which is implicitly made in Wheeler’s 
models through posing a fundamental question 
of meaning: why is the universe?  
 
Implicit  Purposiveness in Wheeler ’s  
Participatory Universe  
 
Finally we want to discuss a teleological aspect 
of Wheeler’s thought. For the universe to 
become the World of Existence this same 
universe must have conditions for the 
emergence of intelligent life and thus its 
explicability. Correspondingly if the World of 
Existences, as it seems from Wheeler’s 
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writings, is that high term in the overall chain 
of transformations in the universe, so to speak 
its “ontic” goal, then the presence of the human 
intelligence in the universe is somehow 
implanted into this goal. When the 
Participatory AP asserts that observers are 
necessary for the universe to come into being it 
effectively states that the development of the 
universe must have a necessary condition for 
the emergence of human beings.  Here one can 
ask a question as to whether there is an 
implied teleology in Wheeler’s view of the 
universe, where teleology is referred to a 
definite material pole, that is to that physical 
state of the universe when human life  is 
possible. Probably one must give a negative 
answer to this question because the necessary 
conditions for emergence of biological life in 
the universe do not automatically guarantee 
the emergence of intelligence. The sufficient 
conditions for the emergence of intelligence in 
the universe are not subject to the physical 
description. Correspondingly the seeming 
teleology of Wheeler’s account for the genesis 
of the World of Existences is not related to the 
material goal of the universe’s development; it 
rather relates to another teleology, associated 
with the explicability of the universe by 
human agency. In fact, in Wheeler’s case, this 
explicability is closely  connected with the 
constitution of meaning of the universe: to 
constitute the universe as the World of 
Existences one must establish the meaning of 
things in this universe. Thus the whole pattern 
of Wheeler’s reasoning when he invokes an 
analogy with the quantum questions and 
answers points not to the material pole, or a 
result of its constitution (for it seems to be an 
open-ended process)  but rather to the strategy 
or methodology of the scientific quest for 
meaning of the universe, a particular way of 
interrogation of nature and its outcome 
delimited by  this way (See (Nesteruk 
2012[3])). The objective of physics is to explain 
the universe; the telos of this explanation is not 
something which pre-exists this explanation, 
but that remote epistemological ideal, a 
supposed mental accomplishment, which would 
correspond to an imagined convergence of 
different strategies of explanation and 
correspondence rules. In spite of a principal 
impossibility of stating even roughly the 
possible ideal pole of such an explanation, 
there is one teleological example which makes 
it possible to elucidate the sense of what 
Wheeler implied in his idea of the 
Participatory universe. This example relates to 
the Big Bang, the ultimate beginning and 
origin of all things in the universe, including 
human intelligence itself.  
 
 The notion of the Big Bang was at the 
centre of Wheeler’s discussions on the nature 
of space and time as that epistemological 
boundary beyond which physics cannot 
proceed. He also drew the conclusion that since 
the notions of space and time loose their 
physical meaning in the singularity of the Big 
Bang, they must be considered  mutable 
ingredients of physics subject to constitution. 
Correspondingly the Big Bang itself is not  an 
immutable material pole associated with the 
origin and beginning of all things, but a 
construction whose anomalous properties point 
not so much to the  limiting capacities of 
physicists to deal with the questions of origin, 
but rather to a specific way in the acquisition 
of reality (through the logic of questions and 
answers) which leads to the constitution of 
what is meant by the Big Bang.  It is 
remarkable, however, that  the process of 
constitution of the universe, as being directed 
in the future of the historical time associated 
with observers, encompasses all temporal aeons 
of the universe, including its allegedly existing 
past. This means that not only our actual 
present is subject to constitution, but  what is 
aimed to be the past  and future of the universe 
is constituted by the human observers and thus 
their ontological status becomes ambiguous. 
The Big Bang, for example,  appears to be also 
a mental construct dealing with the alleged 
past of the universe, but only through 
references to here and now, because its theory 
is constructed upon observations made here and 
now and progressing to the future. 
Correspondingly, for Wheeler, the question of 
the physical existence of the Big Bang has no 
sense if it is not placed in the context of how it 
is  constituted and articulated by human 
observers here and now. He expresses this 
conviction by posing a question: “Is the term 
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‘big bang’ merely a shorthand way to describe 
the cumulative consequence of billions upon 
billions of elementary acts of observer-
participancy reaching back into the past [..] ?” 
(Wheeler 1994[1], p. 128; Cf. Wheeler 1985, p. 
387). Elsewhere Wheeler generalises this 
thought applying it to the constructed 
temporality of the past: “The ‘past’ is theory. 
The past has no existence except as it is 
recorded in the present. By detecting what 
questions our quantum registering equipment 
shall put in the present, we have an undeniable 
choice in what we have the right to say about 
the past” (Wheeler 1985, p. 366; 1988, p. 13). 20 
The acts of observer-participancy intend to 
reach to the past of the universe, whereas their 
conscious dynamics is constantly directed to 
the future.  Certainly, according to Wheeler, 
there  is no sense to enquire into the “objective” 
sense of the universe before or beyond the 
intelligence emerged; as expressed in  a 
philosophical context by Christos Yannaras, 
“even the formation of the universe “before” the 
appearance of its human cognition does not 
destroy the character of being invited-to-
relationship of the universe’s referentiality. 
For the “before” and  “after” are by-products of 
the relationship  between humanity and the 
world, the only relationship that constitutes an 
existential fact and whatever “pre”-required 
evolutionary process is needed for its 
realisation”  (Yannaras 2004, p. 138) (Cf. 
(Wheeler 1975, p. 17)). 
 If the Big Bang is constituted in the 
ongoing process of exploration of the universe, 
the whole issue of the initial conditions of the 
universe as if they were once and forever set 
from the “outside” of the universe looses its 
objectivistic sense, because the whole history of 
the universe is constructed by humanity from 
its present state so that the past of the universe 
is seen only in the perspective of the ever 
moving present and the ultimate point in the 
                                                
20  This thought must be placed into an even more 
general conviction that in the ultimate scheme of 
things there is no time or temporality at all. 
Temporality is a human construction: “The word 
Time came, not from heaven, but from the mouth of 
man, an early thinker, his name long lost. If 
problems attend the term, they are of our own 
making” (Wheeler 1994[2], p. 6).  
past, the origin of all, can then be grasped as a 
limiting point of humanity’s knowledge not 
only as a boundary of its present state of 
understanding but as an ideal aspired for 
through the movement of knowledge to the 
future, that is as it telos.  In this case  the 
notion of the Big Bang functions in human 
knowledge as a limiting point for any 
historically given state of knowledge, but, at 
the same time this limit as being extended 
through the progress of science becomes the 
ground of its motivation and aspiration 
explicating not only the Big Bang as a remote 
physical pole, but also explicating the evolving 
epistemology of the enquiry in the foundation 
of the facticity of all, including the very 
enquiring consciousness. Here we inevitably 
come to an interesting and counter-intuitive 
conclusion that the Big Bang, as an allegedly 
physical pole in the origin of the visible 
universe, turns out to be the telos of scientific 
explanation, as its ultimate goal to see the 
origin of the varied display in the universe in 
the unity of “all in all”.21  
 
 In practically all papers related to the 
genesis of the World of Existences Wheeler 
promotes an idea of the cosmological 
singularity or the Big Bang which has 
demonstrated to us that all classical laws of 
physics as well as its basic notions disappear at 
the singularity, so that the “ultimate, 
underlying” reality cannot be described in 
terms of physical laws and categories at all: 
there is a law, that there is no law. Elsewhere 
the situation with the impossibility to 
ascribing to the Big Bang spatio-temporal 
attributes and at the same time the fact that it 
is the Big-Bang which supposed to give 
“beginning” to space and time in their facticity, 
was qualified as that the Big Bang notifies in 
theory the “existential” fact of the uniqueness 
and concreteness of the universe without 
entailing the materiality of its existence 
(Yannaras 2004, p. 107). Indeed, if the Big 
Bang, according to Wheeler is the 
construction, that is constituted through the 
relationship between the world and humanity, 
                                                
21 This point was developed  in (Nesteruk 2008, 
2012[1]). 
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then what is the objectivistic and material 
status of this construction: does the 
phenomenality of the Big Bang falls into the 
category of the physical “out there”? Yannaras 
poses a question in an even more radical form: 
if the Big Bang is the metaphysical concept 
which presupposes an obligatory exit from 
succession of before and after, and also from 
every dimensional location, does it entail the 
exist from the presupposition of the existent? 
(Yannaras 2004, p. 105) Wheeler’s answer is 
that it does not: the Big Bang can be attributed 
the status of the existent but in a strictly 
constituted sense in the same way that he 
advocates that the laws of classical physics are 
constituted by us.  
 
 It is not difficult to conjecture that the 
only “real” law which drives physics is the 
“law” that the universe must be explicable. It is 
impossible to deny this requirement for 
explicability even in Wheeler’s thought, for, in 
fact, all his edifice of dealing with the genesis 
of physics is to advocate the explicability of the 
universe whatever philosophical orientation 
taken. In this sense it is this explicability 
which becomes the ultimate telos of the whole 
complex of human observers – the universe. 
The maxim of teleology, if one uses Kant’s 
terminology, ordains in Wheeler’s scheme of 
things the use of some established physical 
law-like strategies for giving more precise 
details of the genesis of physical objects. 22 
There is an implicit purposiveness in the closed 
circuit established between observers and 
physical reality which ultimately proceeds 
from the nature of observers as human 
intelligent beings endowed with the 
purposiveness of any actions. This 
purposiveness, in order to avoid any classical 
and unfashionable teleology related to the 
physical development of the universe, must 
presuppose an extra-physical character. Seen 
theologically, the purposiveness can proceed 
from the Divine image, set up exactly for the 
purpose of bringing the universe to union with 
God through an integrate knowledge of it 
(Nesteruk 2003, p. 230). If this theological 
                                                
22 See more details on this issue in (Nesteruk 
2012[3]). 
stance seems to be unsatisfactory and one 
becomes inclined towards a materialistic 
reductionism, attributing the purposiveness of 
explanation as being implanted in physical 
reality, then the alleged purposiveness  of the 
universe brings us to the question of its subject: 
who is that intentional agent for whom the 
universe has a purpose? It is not difficult to see 
that the idea of the Divine subjectivity enters 
the scheme of things at a different level: the 
Participatory AP in this case becomes similar 
to that version of the Strong AP which 
postulates that the universe must have human 
agencies as its product at a certain stage of its 
development. If this is true, then the difference 
between the Participatory AP and the Strong 
AP, which was so emphatically advocated by 
Wheeler become blurred. Our analysis thus 
unfolds the most important and metaphysical 
point to be made on Wheeler’s ideas, namely 
the mystery and precarious status of human 
agents, observers-participants in what   
concerns the origin of their purposive actions 
which are in the foundation of knowledge of 
the universe. It seems that Wheeler’s hope that 
human intelligence and correspondingly 
purposiveness as such will eventually become a 
subject of explanation by physics remains in 
vain, for the basic question of the facticity of 
the human intelligent agency, in spite of all 
reductionist hopes, remains unanswered. 
Purposiveness is a human aspect of existence 
and one can hardly believe that physics, being 
purposive activity, can explain the emergence 
of this purposiveness out of itself. What is 
important, however, is that the existence of life 
and  intelligence, being an “experiential fact” 
and determining the lines of scientific enquiry 
provides “the unlimited informative value for 
the universe and its laws” (Yannaras 2004, p.  
117). 
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Appendix:  Humanity as the centre of disclosure and manifestation of the universe  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements :  
This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton 
Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. I would like to express my feelings of gratitude to 
George Horton and Christopher Dewdney for reading the manuscript and making helpful suggestions. 
 
Bibliography: 
Barrow, J. D.,   Tipler, F.  The Cosmological Anthropic Principle. Oxford University Press, 1986. 
 
Barrow, J. D., Between Inner Space and Outer Space: Essays on Science, Art and Philosophy. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
Carr, B. J. “On the Origin, Evolution and Purpose of the Physical Universe.” In Modern Cosmology 
and Philosophy, ed. J. Leslie, 152–57. New York: Prometheus, 1998. 
 
Carr, D., Paradox of Subjectivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
Clément, O., Le Christ Terre des Vivants. Essais Théologiques. Spiritualite  Orientale, n. 17, 
Abbaye de  Bellfontaine, 1976. 
 
Davis, P. J., R. Hersh,  Descartes’ Dream, London: Penguin, 1990. 
 20 
 
De Laguna, G.,  On Existence and the Human World. New Haven and London: Yale 
 University Press, 1966.  
 
Einstein, A.,  Ideas and Opinions. London: Souvenir Press, 1973. 
 
Gurwitsch, A.  Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1966. 
 
Gurwitsch, A.   ‘Galilean Physics in the light of Husserl’s Phenomenology’ , in  E. McMullin (ed), 
Galileo. Man of Science (New-York, Basic Books, 1967, pp. 388-401).    
 
Gurwitsch, A.  Phenomenology and the Theory of Science (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1974). 
 
Heelan, P.,  “An Anti-Epistemological or Ontological Interpretation of the Quantum Theory and 
Theories Like It”. In In B.E. Babich, D. B. Bergoffen, S. V. Glynn  (eds.) Continental and 
Postmodern Perspectives in the Philosophy of Science.  Aldershot: Avebury, 1992,  pp. 55-68. 
 
Heidegger, M., Nietzsche. Volume IV: Nihilism. San Francisco, Harper, 1987. 
 
Heidegger, M., Identity and Difference, New York, Harper Row, 1969.  
 
Husserl, E. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,  Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970. 
 
Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. 2nd ed. Trans. N. K. Smith. London: Macmillan,1933. 
 
Kockelmans, J. Phenomenology and Physical Science, Duquesne University, 1966. 
 
Kvasz, L., “Galilean Physics in Light of Husserlian Phenomenology”, Philosophia  Naturalis, vol. 39, 
2002, pp. 209-33. 
 
Levinas, E.,  Existence and Existents. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978. 
 
Levinas, E., Time and the Other. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987.  
 
Marcel, G., Being and Having, London: Collins, 1965. 
 
Margenau, H., “Phenomenology and Physics”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 5, n. 
2, 1944, pp. 269-280.  
 
Margenau, H., The Nature of Physical Reality: A Philosophy of Modern Physics.  Woodbridge, Conn.: 
Ox Bow Press, 1977.  
 
Marion, J.-L., Certitudes négatives, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 2010. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M., Phenomenology of Perception, London: Routledge, 1962. 
 
Nesteruk, A. V., “Temporal Irreversibility: Three Modern Views.” In Time, Creation and World-Order, 
ed. M. Wegener, 62–86. Acta Jutlandica, vol. 74, no. 1; Humanities Series, vol. 72. Aarhus, Denmark: 
Aarhus University Press, 1999. 
 
Nesteruk, A. V., Light from the East:  Theology, Science and the Eastern Orthodox Tradition.  
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, July 2003  
 
Nesteruk, A. V., “The Universe as Hypostatic Inherence in the Logos of God”. (Panentheism  in the 
Eastern Orthodox Perspective.) In: In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Reflections  on 
Panentheism in a Scientific Age.  William B. Eerdmans  Publishing Company,  2004, pp. 169-183.  
 21 
 
Nesteruk, A., The Universe as Communion. Towards a Neo-Patristic Synthesis of Theology and 
Science, London: T&T Clark, 2008.  
 
Nesteruk,  A. V., “The Origin of the Universe and Event of Birth: Phenomenological Parallels”,  
Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences, vol. 5, n. 2, 2012[1], pp. 172-
205. 
 
Nesteruk, A. V., “Towards Constituting the Identity of the Universe: Apophaticism and Transcendental 
Delimiters in Cosmology” Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences., vol. 
5, n. 3, 2012[2], pp. 358-394. 
 
Nesteruk,  A. V., “Cosmology and Teleology: Purposiveness in the Study of the Universe through the 
Reading of Kant’s Third Critique,  Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social 
Sciences, vol. 5, n. 9, 2012[3], pp. 1304-1335. 
 
Pascal, B., Pensées. Selections (Martin Jarret-Kerr, C.R. tr. and ed.) London: SCM Press Ltd, 1959.    
 
Primack, J., Abrams, N. E., The View from the Centre of the Universe. Discovering  our 
Extraordinary Place in the Cosmos. London: Fourth Estate, 2006. 
 
Steinbock, A. J. Home and Beyond. Generative Phenomenology after Husserl.  Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press, 1995. 
 
Ströker, E., Investigations in Philosophy of Space, Ohio University Press, 1965. 
 
Tipler, F.,   The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead. 
London: Macmillan, 1995. 
 
Torrance, T. F., The Grammar of Theology: Consonance between Theology and Science, Edinburgh 
and New York, T&T Clark, 2001. 
 
Weyl, H., The Continuum, New York, Dover, 1994. 
 
Wheeler, J. A., Einstein’s Vision, Springer, Berlin. 1968. 
 
Wheeler, J. A.,    “From Relativity to Mutability.” Physicist’s Conception of Nature 1972, ed. 
 J. Mehra, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973, pp. 202-47. 
 
 Wheeler, J. A., “The Universe as Home for Man.” In The Nature of Scientific Discovery, ed. 
 O. Gingerich, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1975, pp. 261-96. 
 
Wheeler, J. A.,  “Genesis and Observership.” In Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, Eds.  
R. Butts and J. Hintikka, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977, pp. 1-33. 
 
Wheeler, J. A., “The Quantum and the Universe.” In Relativity, Quanta, and Cosmology in the 
Development of the Scientific Thought of Albert Einstein, ed. M. Pantaleo and F. de Finis, 807–25. 
New York: Johnson Reprint, 1979. 
 
Wheeler, J. A., “On Recognising Law without Law.” American Journal of Physics 51, 1983 pp. 394–
404. 
 
Wheeler, J. A., “Bohr’s ‘Phenomenon’ and ‘Law Without Law’”, in G. Casati (ed) Chaotic  
Behaviour  in Quantum Systems. Theory and Applications. Proceedings NATO Achievements, 1985, 
pp. 363-78. 
 
Wheeler, J. A.,  “How Come the Quantum?” In New Techniques and Ideas in Quantum Measurement 
Theory, ed. D. M. Greenberger,. New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1987, pp. 304–16 
 
 22 
Wheeler, J. A., “World as a System Self-Synthesized by Quantum Networking.” IBM Journal of 
Research and Development 32, 1988, pp.  4–15. 
 
Wheeler, J. A., At Home in the Universe. New York: American Institute of Physics, 1994[1]. 
 
Wheeler, J. A., “Time Today”, in J. J. Haliwell, J. Pe’rez-Mercader, W. H. Zurek (Eds.) Physical 
Origins of Time Asymmetry, Cambridge University Press, 1994[2], pp. 1-29.    
 
Yannaras, C., Postmodern Metaphysics, Brookline, MS: Holy Cross Orthodox  Press, 2004. 
 
 
 
